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ARTICLES
Resolving Conflicts with Foreign
Nondisclosure Laws:
An Analysis of the Vetco Case
DAVID K. PANSIUS *
The conflict between U.S. discovery rules and foreign nondisclosure
laws is, and has been, one of the most perplexing issues for U.S. courts.1
The court must consider, on the one hand, the need for a strong policy in
favor of discovery procedures.2 This need is perhaps greatest in the inter-
national setting where witnesses and documents are beyond the easy
reach of the adversary who seeks discovery. On the other hand, the court
subconsciously, if not consciously, recognizes that it is a denial of due
process to impose penalties on a litigant for failing to produce documents
which another nation genuinely and legitimately forbids him to disclose.'
The seemingly insoluble nature of the dilemma begs for some kind of
structured analysis that will guide the court in reaching a fair and equita-
ble resolution of the discovery conflict. The need for a more ordered form
of analyzing the conflict with foreign nondisclosure laws is highlighted by
* David K. Pansius practices law in San Jose, California. B.A., University of North
Carolina, 1969; M.A., University of North Carolina, 1973; J.D., University of Denver, 1978;
L.L.M., New York University, 1979; Member, California and Colorado Bars.
1. The issue has been the subject of a number of provocative commentaries. See, e.g.,
Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in
Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 487 (1969); Note, Limitations on the
Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441
(1963); Note, Ordering Production of Documents From Abroad Contrary to Foreign Law, 31
U. CHi. L. REv. 791 (1964); Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Anti-
trust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning Foreign Illegality Excuse for
Nonproduction, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1969); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Do-
mestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Freeman v. Selig-
son, 405 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1033 (1978).
3. In Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210 (1958), the Court stated that the striking of a complaint due to
plaintiff's legal inability to comply with a production order provoked "substantial constitu-
tional questions." However, where constitutional objections were made as one of the major
defenses against enforcement of a grand jury subpoena contrary to foreign law, these objec-
tions were rejected. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the recent Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Vetco, Inc.4 There
is little doubt that the Ninth Circuit was correct to enforce an Internal
Revenue Service subpoena of documents allegedly barred from disclosure
by Swiss law. However, by employing the wrong reasoning in reaching the
decision, substantial confusion may be created in the future if the same
general issue is relitigated, but with different facts.
I. THE SUBPOENA IN Vetco
Vetco is a U.S. corporation which manufactures offshore drilling
equipment. Vetco International, A.G. (VIAG) is a wholly owned Swiss
subsidiary of Vetco which sold Vetco's product. If the product were
shipped to and sold directly to VIAG by Vetco, then Vetco would suffer
substantial additional tax liability due to the creation of Subpart F in-
come.' To avoid this result, Vetco shipped the product to two other Swiss
companies: Wiedex, A.G. and Zanora, A.G.6
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) argued that the interposition of
these two intermediary companies was but a subterfuge for avoiding the
taxing rules of Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, and that the two
companies should be ignored for serving no business purpose. In order to
prove its contention, the IRS subpoenaed certain business records of
Vetco located in Switzerland, and it also subpoenaed certain records of
the Swiss office of Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells (DH&S), one of Vetco's ac-
countants. Vetco refused to comply with the subpoena and ordered
DH&S to refuse to comply as well.7
The basis for Vetco's refusal to comply with the subpoena was Swiss
nondisclosure law. Vetco alleged that to reveal the documents in question
would be a violation of article 273 of the Swiss Penal code.' That provi-
sion, as it was quoted in Vetco, provided in part:
Whoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to
a foreign governmental agency or a foreign organization or private en-
terprise or to an agent of any of them; shall be subject to imprison-
4. 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981).
5. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) & (d)(1)(1954 & Supp. 1981). Subpart F income is certain in-
come of a foreign corporation controlled by certain U.S. persons which is imputed back to
the U.S. shareholder regardless of whether the foreign corporation has made any distribu-
tions to the U.S. shareholder. How and to what extent these rules apply is perhaps one of
the most complex portions of the Internal Revenue Code. A number of articles, books and
treatises analyze these provisions. An appropriate source for aid in understanding these
rules is R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCoMz TAXATiON OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS
(1981). The general purpose of the Subpart F rules is to minimize the use of foreign corpo-
rations in low-tax jurisdictions for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.
6. Income earned from the sale of products purchased from these independent Swiss
companies would not be Subpart F income and would therefore create no immediate ad-
verse tax consequences to Vetco.
7. 644 F.2d at 1327.
8. Id. at 1329; Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (STGB); Code p6nal suisse (C.P.);
Codice penale svizzero (COD. P9N.), art. 273.
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ment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a penitentiary. The im-
prisonment may be combined with a fine."
Swiss law defined the term "business secret" to include "all facts of Swiss
life to the extent that there are interests worthy of protection in keeping
them confidential." 10
The crux of the Ninth Circuit's decision to enforce the subpoena de-
spite Swiss law is based upon a reliance on the balancing test. Like a
number of courts before it, Vetco applied the rules of sections 39 and 40
of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign Relations. Section
39(1) of the Restatement provides that "A state having jurisdiction to
prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising its
jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in
conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another state having
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.""1
The U.S. courts have the international jurisdiction to enforce discov-
ery procedures in matters over which the court has subject matter juris-
diction where the person against whom discovery is sought is under the
personal jurisdiction of the court, and that person has control over the
documents or data which are being sought by the court.' On the other
hand, a foreign government has enforcement jurisdiction to bar release of
documents or data located within the territorial jurisdiction of that gov-
ernment.'8 When the IRS sought documents from Vetco which allegedly
could not be released under Swiss law, the conflict in enforcement juris-
diction described in section 39 of the Restatement becomes applicable.
Section 39(2) of the Restatement directs inquiry to section 40 of the
Restatement for factors to consider in minimizing the conflict in enforce-
ment jurisdiction. Section 40 sets forth a general rule of international
comity and then amplifies that with five factors to evaluate:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules
of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
9. 644 F.2d at 1329.
10. Id. See also Swiss Federal Attorney v. A., 98 BG IV 209 (Sept. 7, 1972).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 39
(1965).
12. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (N.D. IMI. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See also SEC v. Minasde Artemisa,
S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
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(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state."'
The Vetco court did a most admirable job in attempting to fit the
facts of the Vetco case into the framework of the factors of the Restate-
ment. With respect to national interests, the court noted the strong U.S.
interest in collecting taxes; the court also noted the interest of the Swiss
Government in preserving the secrecy of business documents."6 The court
found, however, that the interest of U.S. law was superior. First, the court
noted that the persons from whom documents were sought are subsidiar-
ies of U.S. companies, not Swiss parent companies. Second, the court
noted that the penalties of the law are not imposed where the informa-
tion concerned involves only private interests, and the party whose busi-
ness secret is being divulged consents to the disclosure. Presumably,
Vetco could have consented to the disclosure or could have otherwise ob-
tained the necessary consents. The court also noted that the IRS is under
a duty to keep information confidential and therefore no real "disclosure"
is occurring." With respect to hardship, the court expressed serious
doubts whether Vetco would suffer any penalties under Swiss law for dis-
closing the information in question. 7 The court concluded as well that
interests of nationality and location did not weigh in favor of the Swiss
law.'" Also to be considered was the importance of the documents to the
IRS investigation.1 '
Finally, the court considered the availability of alternate means of
compliance. A tax treaty was then, and is now, in force between the
United States and Switzerland.2 0 This treaty provides for mechanisms
whereby the two Governments can exchange information relevant to tax
investigations. The treaty would seem to provide a reasonably efficient
means for the IRS to obtain its information without having to resort to
enforcing a subpoena in alleged violation of Swiss law.
However, the court noted that in the Swiss-U.S. treaty, Switzerland
reserved the right not to disclose business secrets.2 1 The court also stated
that the Swiss were notoriously reluctant to assist U.S. authorities in the
14. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOBMGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 40
(1965).
15. 644 F.2d at 1331.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1331-32.
18. Id. at 1332.
19. Id.
20. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Sept. 27,
1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751; T.I.A.S. No. 2316, art. XVI [hereinafter
cited as Income Tax Convention].
21. 644 F.2d at 1333.
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investigation of tax fraud cases.'2 Therefore, the court ruled that the
treaty provided an inadequate alternative means for obtaining the docu-
ments2 8 Other alternative means of discovery were likewise rejected as
impractical." By applying the factors of Restatement section 40, the
court concluded that it was appropriate for the court to impose sanctions
on Vetco for failing to comply with the IRS subpoena. Having balanced
the relevant factors in view of the interests of comity, the U.S. interest in
enforcing the subpoena proved superior.
25
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result but for
the wrong reason. There was no need to employ a balancing test as there
was never any showing by Vetco that a conflict with Swiss law existed.
Moreover, where there is a genuine conflict between U.S. discovery proce-
dures and foreign nondisclosure laws, the so-called balancing test of Re-
statement section 40 is, in most instances, ill-equipped to resolve the con-
flict. Additionally, by analyzing the case as if a conflict of law existed, the
Ninth Circuit made the strong implication that the provisions of existing
treaties are not the exclusive means for obtaining discovery. The Ninth
Circuit implied that the IRS can go beyond treaty procedures even when
to do so would require the person subject to discovery to violate the law
of the foreign state which signed the treaty. Under the balancing test, a
treaty must be considered whenever a genuine conflict of law takes place.
II. THE RULES OF Societ.
Before any kind of balancing need take place, a determination must
first be made whether a genuine conflict of law exists. The rules devel-
oped by the United States Supreme Court in Soci~t6 Internationale pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers's are
designed to force the party subject to discovery to determine if a genuine
22. Id. The complaint of the Vetco court concerning the lack of Swiss cooperation in
tax investigations is perhaps exaggerated. The court cites X & Y Bank v. Swiss Fed. Tax
Admin., 76-1 U.S.T.C. 9452 (Swiss Fed. Sup. Ct., May 16, 1975). In that case the IRS had
requested information concerning the dealings of a certain American citizen with a Swiss
bank. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration conducted an investigation and summarized
its results in an official report that was transmitted to the IRS. The IRS, however, consid-
ered the official report to be inadequate as evidence in U.S. courts and requested certified
originals of the documents in question. The Swiss Supreme Court ruled that the IRS re-
quest should be rejected. The obligations of the Swiss Government under the treaty were to
supply information, not to provide legal assistance in the prosecution of foreign tax fraud
cases.
Perhaps the Swiss Supreme Court's decision evidences a reluctance to prosecute for-
eign tax fraud cases. However, the court only ruled that original documents would not be
provided. The information desired by the IRS had been provided pursuant to the terms of
the treaty. See X v. The Fed. Tax Admin., 711 U.S.T.C. 9435 (Swiss Fed. Sup. Ct., Dec. 23,
1970).
23. 644 F.2d at 1333.
24. Id. at 1332-33.
25. Id. at 1333.
26. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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conflict with foreign law exists.27 If the burdened party makes a good
faith effort to comply with the discovery order, and yet is still barred by
foreign law, the approach of the courts seems to have been to engage in a
balancing of necessity. However, it is the rare case which reveals a genu-
ine conflict with foreign law. In most instances the conflict, if any, is su-
perficial, and can be resolved if the party subject to discovery makes rea-
sonable efforts to obtain permission to disclose the documents in
question.
The situation posed in Soci&t presents the dilemma of what to do
where foreign nondisclosure law is in direct conflict with a U.S. discovery
order. The plaintiff in Soci~tk brought suit to recover assets confiscated
by the U.S. Government pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act2 8
that was imposed during World War II. The issue was whether a Swiss
holding company, Chemie, was so intimately connected with German in-
terests that the U.S. Government had the right to confiscate assets owned
by it in the United States."'
The United States sought discovery in Switzerland of certain bank-
ing records that the United States thought would prove the German affili-
ation of Chemie. Chemie sought to comply, but many of the records were
"confiscated" by Swiss authorities. The Swiss Government ordered that
these documents could not be delivered to the U.S. courts. Because of the
plaintiff's consequent inability to comply with the court's discovery order,
the district court ordered that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.3 0
The Supreme Court reversed the district court and the court of ap-
peals which had affirmed.81 Where Chemie was legally unable to comply
with the production order, dismissal of its suit was inappropriate. If sanc-
tions were to be imposed, lesser sanctions had to be chosen . 2 In so con-
cluding, Socigtg developed a two-part rule. The first rule is that the mere
existence of foreign nondisclosure laws does not preclude the issuance of
a discovery order by the court.3 It might seem that this rule provides the
27. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C.
1952).
28. 357 U.S. 198 (1958); Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1941), amended
by 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (Supp. 1981).
29. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953).
30. Id. at 437-38.
31. Soci6t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
32. 357 U.S. at 212-13.
33. Id. at 204-05; 644 F.2d at 1329-30. "Sociftk implies that consideration of foreign law
problems in a discovery context is required in dealing with sanctions to be imposed for
disobedience and not in deciding whether the discovery order should issue." Arthur Ander-
sen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976).
Once personal jurisdiction over the person and control over the documents by
the person are present, a U.S. court has the power to order production of the
documents. The existence of a conflicting foreign law which prohibits the dis-
closure of the requested documents does not prevent the exercise of this power.
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district courts with a carte blanche to ignore the consequences of foreign
law in issuing discovery orders. However, such is not the case. It should
always be remembered that the court in Socitg ruled in favor of the bur-
dened party subject to the foreign nondisclosure law. The result in So-
cit limits the powers of the court regarding discovery in conflict with
foreign nondisclosure laws. The purpose of the rule stating that no for-
eign nondisclosure law will preclude the issuance of a discovery order is to
shift the burden of proof. By permitting the discovery order to issue, a
duty has been placed on the burdened party to determine if a genuine
conflict of law exists.3
4
The second rule of Soci~tg is that if a burdened party makes a good
faith effort to comply with the order and to eliminate or minimize conflict
with foreign law, yet the foreign government still forbids compliance with
the discovery order, then the burdened party will not be unduly penalized
for his noncompliance."
It might, perhaps, be instructive to compare the efforts at compliance
made by Chemie, the burdened party, in Sociktk with the efforts at com-
pliance made by Vetco. In Sociktk, Swiss authorities seized the docu-
ments in question and barred their production, although physical posses-
sion of the documents remained with Chemie. In order to ascertain
whether or not Chemie made a good faith effort to comply with the pro-
duction order, the court appointed a Special Master. That Special Master
made the following findings: (1) Chemie had indeed made a good faith
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. I. 1979). See also In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977).
34. In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), the appellate
court ruled that the lower court could properly issue an order of discovery despite contrary
foreign law. The court also noted that, if a violation of Swiss public policy is claimed, it is
up to the burdened party t bring forward evidence that the Swiss Government objects to
these specific disclosures. Id. at 342. Ultimately the court of appeals determined that the
alleged conflict with Swiss law was more imaginary than real. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978).
Earlier cases which suggested that discovery orders could not issue contrary to foreign
law are no longer followed in this regard. Compare United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1981) (courts must balance competing interests in determining whether foreign
illegality ought to preclude enforcement of an IRS summons.); In re Uranium Antitrust Li-
tig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (once personal jurisdiction over the person and con-
trol over the documents by the person are present, a U.S. court has power to order produc-
tion of the documents.); and Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 388 (10th Cir.
1976) (the court could properly issue an order of discovery despite contrary foreign law
when alleged conflict is more imaginary than real.) with Application of Chase Manhattan
Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1961) (where compliance with subpoena duces tecurn is shown
to violate foreign law, the court could modify the subpoena, leaving it outstanding to insure
that the bank would continue to cooperate with the government, if the government asked
the foreign government to authorize production of the document.) and Ings v. Ferguson, 282
F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1960) (process of courts of any sovereign state cannot cross interna-
tional boundary lines and be enforced in a foreign country.).
35. 357 U.S. at 210-13; In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563
F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
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effort at compliance; (2) there was no evidence of collusion between
Chemie and the Swiss Government; (3) Chemie's officers did their best to
obtain Swiss approval for releasing the documents; (4) there was a sub-
stantial legal basis under Swiss law for the seizure of the documents by
the Swiss Government; and (5) obtaining waivers would not have pro-
cured the release of the documents. The report of the Master was ac-
cepted by the district court.3e
In ruling that sanctions would not be imposed for failing to comply
with the discovery order, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Special
Master's findings.3 7 The Court also noted Chemie's successful efforts to
obtain the release of some documents, and its unsuccessful efforts to ob-
tain waivers permitting release of other documents.ss Chemie also ob-
* tained Swiss approval of a plan whereby, through the use of a neutral
expert, certain relevant documents would be identified and released to
the Court.3 9 Because of the extensive efforts made at compliance, the dis-
missal of plaintiff's action for failure to comply with the discovery order
was an improper exercise of the court's powers under Rule 37.40 Although
the Court left open the door for the imposition of less stringent sanctions,
the strong implication of the Court's decision is that no sanctions should
be imposed, aside from drawing inferences unfavorable to plaintiffs."
In Vetco the Swiss Government made no effort to seize the docu-
ments as it did in Socigtg.42 There was no indication that Vetco sought a
waiver from the Swiss Government for the production of the documents.43
There were, moreover, substantial indications that to release the docu-
ments would not be a violation of Swiss law.44 Finally, the alleged limita-
tion of Swiss law was entirely avoidable by Vetco. 4' The Internal Revenue
Code required Vetco to maintain, in the United States, records regarding
its controlled foreign corporations. 4" Had Vetco done so, there would have
been little or no need to obtain records from Switzerland. Vetco gave
every indication that it actively sought to use Swiss law as a shield
against IRS inquiry. Although there is no published court record to ex-
36. 111 F. Supp. at 439-40.
37. 357 U.S. at 201.
38. Id. at 202.
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id. at 212.
41. Id. at 213.
42. "In Socikt6 the Swiss Government enjoined the plaintiff from complying with the
summons. There has been no comparable action taken by the Swiss government in this case,
even though the letters and affidavits filed reveal that the Swiss are not unaware of these
proceedings." 644 F.2d at 1330.
43. "We have no finding that appellants have made good faith efforts to comply with
the summonses." 644 F.2d at 1330. "By contrast, the district court stated at a hearing on
April 1, 1980 that the appellants were conducting 'one of the greatest delaying actions of my
recent memory.'" 644 F.2d at 1330 n.6.
44. 644 F.2d at 1330 n.7, 1332, and accompanying text.
45. I.R.C. § 964(c) (1954); Tress. Reg. § 1.9643 (1978).
46. 644 F.2d at 1332.
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amine, the facts at hand indicate that Vetco did not make a good faith
effort to comply with the discovery order, and since it was entirely un-
clear whether a true violation of Swiss nondisclosure law was at issue, it
was entirely proper to impose sanctions on Vetco for its noncompliance
with the discovery order.
4 7
In such circumstances it was inappropriate for the Ninth Circuit to
apply a balancing test as if a conflict of law existed. If, because of the
district court's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
circuit court did not feel competent to conclude that no violation of Swiss
law was at issue,48 the proper course for the court would have been to
remand to the district court for such findings. The Vetco decision illus-
trates an overreliance on the balancing test by the courts, the effect of
which is to create unnecessary confusion regarding the state of the law.
III. THE LIMITATION OF THE BALANCING TEST
The balancing test of Restatement section 40 has a useful, but lim-
ited, role in resolving the discovery versus nondisclosure conflict. The first
rule is that a production order should issue whenever the information
sought is relevant to the suit. The effect of the production order is to
force the burdened party to make a good faith effort at compliance. This
production will reveal where genuine conflicts of law exist. Only after a
burdened party's good faith efforts have failed to produce the requested
documents is it appropriate to apply the balancing test. The balancing
test is used to determine if equivalent policy interests are at stake. If the
public policy of one government is not counterbalanced by a competing
public policy of the other government, section 40 can resolve the conflict.
If, however, the public policy of one government dictates disclosure,
and the public policy of the other government dictates nondisclosure, the
balancing test is incapable of providing a solution since equivalent inter-
ests are at stake. In such a case the court assesses the importance of the
information. If the information is necessary to the prosecution of the
case, the court applies the law of the forum and imposes severe sanctions
for noncompliance with the discovery order. If, however, the information
sought is not of critical importance, then the court is obliged to moderate
its sanctions accordingly.
The limits of the balancing test are aptly, illustrated in the Illinois
district court decision in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation." The court
in Uranium considered only the preliminary question of whether a dis-
covery order could issue against certain defendants for documents which
were barred from production by foreign nondisclosure laws. The case had
not yet reached the stage where the court had to decide what sanction to
47. Ohio v. Finesilver, 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978).
48. The Ninth Circuit felt constrained to characterize the validity of the contempt
sanctions as a question of law rather than as a question of fact. 644 F.2d at 1327-28.
49. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IMI. 1979).
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impose, if any, in the event of noncompliance.
Following the rule in Socigtg, there would be little doubt that the
discovery order would issue, and indeed the Uranium court so ruled.
However, unlike the situation in Sociktk, the court was not faced with a
discovery order in conflict with a nation's general policy of secrecy, but
rather the court faced nondisclosure laws that were drafted for the spe-
cific purpose of thwarting the litigation in question. Westinghouse, obli-
gated to supply uranium at fixed prices to certain customers, had sued a
number of uranium producers, arguing that an international cartel had
been formed to fix the price of uranium. In order to protect their valuable
uranium natural resource, a number of countries passed laws forbidding
the disclosure of documents related to the industry. The principal impact
of such laws was to severely restrict the ability of plaintiffs, such as West-
inghouse, to obtain the data necessary to prove their cases. 50 Unlike So-
cigtg, the conflict with foreign law did not have to be sharpened by re-
quiring the burdened party to attempt good faith compliance. In
Uranium the conflict was obvious. The defendants who sought to avoid
discovery orders argued that no such orders could issue as it would re-
quire action contrary to foreign law. The defendants argued that, under
the rules of comity expressed in section 40 of the Restatement, deference
had to be given to the foreign nondisclosure rules.5'
The Uranium court refused to balance the relative interests of the
United States and the foreign governments. In fact, the Uranium court
concluded that the balancing test was impossible to apply as "the com-
peting interests . . . display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the
same plane of national policy."52 On the one hand, Westinghouse sought
to enforce long established U.S. antitrust policy by requesting the docu-
ments at issue. On the other hand, certain foreign governments con-
sciously sought to negate such legislation by prohibiting the disclosure of
those very same documents. The court concluded that "it is simply im-
possible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually
negating actions." 58
Uranium sets forth the principle that once a genuine conflict with
foreign law has been identified, use of the balancing test is often imprac-
tical. Who is to say which nation's law has a superior interest over an-
other nation's law? It is an accepted principle of international law that
the sovereign rights of nations vis-a-vis each other are equal.5 4 No nation
has more rights under international law than another. If one nation exer-
cises its right to make public policy and directs that documents be dis-
50. Id. at 1148. See Judge Doyle's dissent in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 1000 (10th Cir. 1977).
51. 480 F. Supp. at 1148.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sovereigns of nations are equal and their independence is absolute. The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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closed, while another nation exercises its public policy and directs that
the same documents be kept hidden, and each nation has jurisdiction to
enforce its order, how can any true balancing take place?
IV. THE "BALANCING" OF NECESSITY
Although it appears on the surface that the balancing test is widely
employed, in actual practice what occurs is an evaluation of necessity. If
the discovery sought is necessary to enforce a public law of the United
States, and the party burdened is properly before the court, then discov-
ery is enforced. The court in essence applies the law of the forum when-
ever the relative interests of the two sovereigns are in balance and the
documents are truly needed.55 If, however, it is determined that the pros-
ecution of the U.S. action can reasonably proceed without the requested
documents, then sanctions for failure to comply with the discovery order
are moderated, if not eliminated altogether. The necessity of the informa-
tion will dictate the sanctions to be imposed.
Sociktg is once again an instructive example for analysis. The Su-
preme Court made particular mention that the plaintiff in Socigtk would
not profit by reason of his failure to comply with discovery. In that suit
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish the true ownership
of the stock at issue. The plaintiff's inability to produce certain owner-
ship records would only tend to cast doubt upon the true ownership of
the stock and jeopardize his case. Indeed, the Court noted that it was
perhaps appropriate to make inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff be-
cause of its failure to procure the documents.55 However, any sanction to
be imposed had to be moderated to fit the information at issue. The un-
available documents were not essential to the prosecution of the case, and
therefore it was improper to dismisss the plaintiff's action because of his
legal inability to comply with the U.S. court's discovery order. In remand-
55. Procedures of the law of the forum customarily govern law suits. Neutrals as
well as citizens of the United States must meet the requirements of these pro-
cedures. It seems obvious that foreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the
investigation and discovery of facts in a case, under rules established as condu-
cive to the power and orderly administration of justice in a court of the United
States. Even if a foreign government were itself a party, it must conform to the
law of the forum and make discovery upon order of the court.
Soci~th Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. McGran-
ery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953).
In Ghana Supply Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586, 589 n.3 (D. Mass.
1979), the court applied the discovery rules of the forum to require a plaintiff of Ghana, an
agency of the Ghanaian Government, to produce documents and testimony contrary to
Ghanaian law. The information sought by the defendant was essential to its defense. The
court applied the law of the forum and required that Ghana comply with discovery. In so
doing the court noted that, as plaintiff, the Government of Ghana had a choice: either make
an exception from its own nondisclosure law, or withdraw its suit. See generally Gillies v.
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 468 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1972); Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws
and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612, 614-15 (1979).
56. 357 U.S. at 213.
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ing, the Supreme Court granted the district court wide discretion in
resolving the case, taking into consideration genuine conflicts with Swiss
nondisclosure law.
57
In reaching its decision in Socigtk, the Supreme Court did not engage
in a balancing test of relative interests, nor did the Court suggest that a
balancing test should take place. It did, however, mention that different
facts and circumstances may require the balancing test to be employed.
5 8
The Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 59 illus-
trates the fact that the balancing test can at times be but a mask for the
application of the rule of necessity. Anthony R. Field was the managing
director of Castle Bank and Trust Company in the Cayman Islands.
While in the lobby of the Miami International Airport he was subpoenaed
to appear before a federal grand jury investigating criminal violations of
U.S. tax law.
Field objected to testifying, based in part on his argument that any
testimony he would give would violate the bank secrecy laws of the Cay-
man Islands. ° Field submitted an affidavit by an expert on Cayman Is-
lands law which stated that Field would be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion in the Cayman Islands, with penalties including imprisonment, if he
testified before the grand jury. The Government did not dispute this
claim. Therefore, for the purpose of the evidence presented to the court, a
clear conflict between U.S. and Cayman Islands law was presented."'
After rejecting Field's contention that his testimony was protected by
his Fifth Amendment rights,6 2 the court addressed the conflict of law
question. The Fifth Circuit duly applied the "balancing" test required by
the Restatement. The court examined first and foremost the relative in-
terests of the countries involved. On the one hand, the United States had
an interest in enforcing its tax laws, while on the other hand, the Cayman
Islands had an interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens.
In balancing these interests the court found that the U.S. interest in
enforcing its tax law was superior. The court noted that, under the law of
the Cayman Islands, 3 the information which Field could not reveal to
foreign authorities could be obtained by certain officials of the Cayman
Islands Government. Since the information could have been revealed, it
was not really "secret." The court reasoned: "Since the general rule ap-
pears to be that for domestic investigations such information would be
obtainable, we find it difficult to understand how the bank's customers'
57. Id.
58. Id. at 205-06.
59. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 460.
61. The circuit court quoted a statement by the district court predicting that Mr. Field
would be exposed to criminal charges in the Cayman Islands by reason of his testimony
before the U.S. grand jury. 532 F.2d at 406.
62. 532 F.2d at 406-07.
63. Id. at 409.
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rights of privacy would be significantly infringed simply because the in-
vestigating body is a foreign tribunal.""
In this fashion the Fifth Circuit conveniently contorted the facts so
that it could apply the balancing test and have the U.S. interest emerge
as superior. When the government's interest in pursuing criminal viola-
tions of the tax laws is weighed against bank customers' interests in hav-
ing information revealed only to Cayman Islands authorities and not to
the federal grand jury, it would certainly seem that section 40 of the Re-
statement would require the court to enforce the grand jury subpoena.
However, the purpose of the Cayman Islands law is not merely to
provide bank secrecy. The Cayman Islands is a widely publicized and no-
torious tax haven.6" Only the most naive observer would believe that the
purpose of the secrecy law was anything other than an effort by the Cay-
man Islands Government to limit the ability of foreign governments to
impose taxes on assets located in the Cayman Islands. On the one hand,
the United States has established a public policy of taxing its citizens and
residents on their worldwide income." The Cayman Islands has a policy
that assets located in its country should not be taxed by foreign govern-
ments. To enforce its policy, the Cayman Islands has established laws
which effectively prohibit Cayman Islands banks from assisting foreign
taxing authorities.
67
The situation in Grand Jury Proceedings is directly analogous to the
situation in Uranium where U.S. policy requires discovery, and, as a pol-
icy decision, the foreign government determines that such discovery
should not take place. In such cirumstances, "totally contradictory and
mutually negating" 6 commandments are involved. As each government
has exercised its sovereign jurisdiction to effect contradictory results,
there is no room for balancing. Rather, the question is: Does the U.S.
court need the information so badly that it is willing to exercise its power
over the person burdened with the discovery order and enforce discovery
in repudiation of valid foreign law to the contrary? The fact is that the
64. Id.
65. See generally 1 W. DIAMoND & D. DuIoAND, TAx HAvNs OF THE WORLD (updated
continuously). Sanctions should be limited to fit the needs of the court. Principles of comity
require that the foreign law be recognized except in those instances where it is necessary to
employ the contrary law of the forum in order to uphold the interests of the forum. Comity
principles can be ignored, but only in cases of necessity.
Although more than mere courtesy and accomodation, comity does not achieve
the force of an imperative or an obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression
of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to international duty
and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws. Comity
should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial
to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.
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subpoena was enforced as a matter of necessity. Without the testimony of
an official such as Field, it would have been virtually impossible for the
grand jury to obtain certain information regarding transactions in the
Cayman Islands. Without that information it would have been extremely
difficult for the grand jury to make informed conclusions.6 '
The importance of the necessity of the information to the U.S. pro-
ceeding is further highlighted by another of the uranium litigation cases.
In In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litiga-
tion,70 the Tenth Circuit faced, at the sanctions stage, the same conflict of
law addressed by the Illinois district court in Uranium at the stage where
it issued its discovery order. As directed by the rule of Socit6, the Tenth
Circuit properly assessed the good faith efforts of the burdened party to
comply with discovery orders. The court noted a decision of the Supreme
Court of Ontario which forbade the disclosure of the business records of
the Rio Algom Corporation.7' The Rio Algom Corporation was incorpo-
rated in Delaware, and operated a uranium mine and maintained its cor-
porate offices in Canada. The court mentioned the efforts of Rio Algom to
obtain the permission of the Canadian Government for the release of the
documents requested. The court also cited Rio Algom's diligent efforts to
produce documents and materials that were not subject to the restriction
of Canadian nondisclosure laws. 72 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Rio
Algom had made a good faith effort at compliance with the discovery or-
der under the general principles set forth in Socitt.
7 8
Having therefore determined that a genuine conflict of law existed,
the court proceeded to apply the "balancing" test. To reach the conclu-
sion it desired, the court downplayed the U.S. interest involved. Whereas
the Uranium court described U.S. antitrust policies as of primary impor-
tance, 74 the Tenth Circuit chose to describe the case as an ordinary suit
by a private litigant.7 5 When the interest of the private litigant was bal-
anced against an official opinion of the Supreme Court of Ontario which
barred discovery, the interest favoring nondisclosure prevailed.7
Uranium indicates however, that a balancing test does not work well
69. "To defer to the law of the Cayman Islands and refuse to require Mr. Field to
testify would significantly restrict the essential means that the grand jury has of evaluating
whether to bring an indictment." 532 F.2d at 408.
70. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
71. Id at 995. See Re: Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d
273 (1977).
72. 563 F.2d at 996.
73. Id.
74. 480 F.2d at 1148. Indicative of the importance of the antitrust laws to U.S. public
policy is the eagerness with which they are applied extraterritorially. See, e.g., THE LAw OF
TRANSNATIONAL Busnam TRANSACTIONS § 10.04 (V. Nanda ed. 1981).
75. Rather than describing the interest as the enforcement of the U.S. antitrust law, the
court described the interest at stake as the private litigant's desire for adequate discovery.




when the public policies of two nations are in direct conflict. Judge Doyle
in his dissent in Westinghouse applied the balancing test to virtually the
same facts and concluded that Rio Algom should not be relieved of the
penalties imposed by the district court for noncompliance with the dis-
covery order.7 7 By weighing the importance of one interest against an-
other, a court can reasonably reach almost any conclusion it desires. As
any interest ultimately can be cloaked with national policy, the court is
free to make any interest emerge victorious merely by the description it
puts on the interests involved.
Nonetheless, the majority in Westinghouse probably reached the cor-
rect result-but not by applying the balancing test of Restatement sec-
tion 40. Westinghouse did not rule that Canadian interests in nondisclo-
sure took precedence over U.S. antitrust laws.7 8 Rather, Westinghouse
weighed the need for the information against the prohibitive foreign law
and concluded that the information sought was really not that important.
In its brief analysis of the factors to be balanced, the court made the
following important comment:
We do note that Westinghouse's defense in the ... litigation does
not stand or fall on the present discovery order. Westinghouse has
deposed the officers of various other uranium companies, and the pre-
sent discovery, though admittedly of potential significance, is still in a
sense cumulative. We are not here concerned with any grand jury in-
vestigation, or the enforcement, as such, of the antitrust laws.
7'
Westinghouse's suit was to prove a restraint of trade in regard to
uranium production and sales. Westinghouse was not trying to prove,
necessarily, that Rio Algom committed a criminal violation of the anti-
trust law. As Westinghouse was successful in obtaining information from
a number of other sources regarding the alleged uranium cartel, the court
determined that the information sought from Rio Algom was not really
essential to Westinghouse's case. Because the information was "cumula-
tive," the court chose to defer to the Canadian nondisclosure law.80
Future litigants seeking information barred from disclosure by for-
eign law should take heed of the result in Westinghouse. Westinghouse
lost its claim for discovery not so much because the foreign interest
proved superior to its own, but because it failed to convince the court
that the information sought was essential to the prosecution of its action.
If Westinghouse had successfully convinced the court that the informa-
tion sought was critical in proving its allegations regarding the cartel, per-
77. Id. at 1003. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
78. So long as there is a violation of the antitrust laws it should be irrelevant if the law
is sought to be enforced by a private litigant or by the Department of Justice. In fact the
antitrust law provides for treble damages so as to encourage the private litigant to enforce
the public policy contained in the antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970 & Supp. IV 1981).
79. 563 F.2d at 999.
80. Id.
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haps the result in Westinghouse would have been different. 81
It would be wise for the litigant to emphasize the importance of the
information even before the discovery order issues. In Trade Develop-
ment Bank v. Continental Insurance Co.,"' the Second Circuit ruled that
it was proper for the district court to defer to foreign law and refuse to
order the disclosure of the customers of a Swiss bank, an act that would
have been contrary to the Bank Secrecy Act of Switzerland.83 The district
court had determined that the information sought was of only marginal
relevance and unnecessary to the proceeding." Based upon this finding, it
was proper for the district court to exercise its discretion in favor of the
foreign law."
The defendant insurance company complained that the district court
should have at least required the Swiss bank to make a good faith effort
to obtain waivers of the Swiss secrecy law. The circuit court determined
that, although it would have been proper for the district court to require
the bank to seek waivers, the district court was not obligated to do so,
particularly when the defendant failed to request that the court make
such an order." Again, the party seeking discovery bears the burden of
demonstrating to the court that the information sought is of sufficient
importance to justify interference with the foreign nondisclosure law.
By recognizing that the factors outlined in section 40 of the Restate-
ment are for the most part inadequate for deciding discovery versus non-
disclosure conflicts, the following general rules emerge: As set forth in So-
cit , and as further refined in a number of decisions which are not dis-
cussed here, the court always, if it chooses, has the power to issue an
order for discovery of foreign information, regardless of the nature of for-
eign law. The burden shifts to the person subject to discovery either to
comply with the order or demonstrate to the court that, despite every
good faith effort to comply, the discovery sought remains precluded by
foreign law. If a burdened party fails to make this good faith showing,
penalties for noncompliance will be imposed regardless of how the foreign
law ostensibly is applied. The purpose of these rules is to force the bur-
dened party, through its efforts at compliance, to prove and clarify ex-
actly what the conflicts are between the discovery order and the foreign
81. Even absent such a showing it is hard not to have some sympathy for Judge Doyle's
view that perhaps the law of the forum should apply and the sanctions be upheld. Unlike
Socikt#, the party burdened here by the discovery order directly profited from the nondis-
closure rules of the foreign government. In fact the Canadian Government had passed those
laws for the express purpose of thwarting litigation like the suit brought by Westinghouse.
Perhaps the American court should have given the American plaintiff stronger support in
fighting these restrictions. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155,
629 P.2d 231 (1980).
82. 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
83. Id. at 39-40.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Id. at 41.




If, despite the burdened party's good faith efforts to comply, the for-
eign government still bars the disclosure of certain information sought by
the U.S. court, then the court must apply a form of "balancing" test. De-
spite the language in court opinions, the court does not balance the rela-
tive interests of the parties concerned. Where the public policies of two
nations are in conflict, there is nothing to balance, as there is a "stand-
off." Rather, the court weighs the need for the information or discovery
procedure sought against its knowledge that enforcing discovery will of-
fend a public policy of a foreign sovereign, and will subject the burdened
party to sanctions in that foreign country. If the information is truly nec-
essary to the court's proceeding, sanctions must be imposed in order to
try to compel discovery. When everything else is equal, the law of the
forum should prevail.
However, if the information is not truly necessary to the proceeding,
if substantial justice can be done without the information sought, then
the court should defer to the foreign law. In so deferring, the court makes
no finding that the policy interest of another country is superior to that
of the United States in the matter concerned. The court merely concludes
that, since the policies of the United States can be effected without the
information sought, deference to the foreign law will be permitted.
V. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST
The balancing test is not always ignored. Recall that the balancing
test cannot resolve situations where the public policies of two nations are
in direct conflict. But Restatement section 40 can yield results where the
public policy of one government is not at stake or where the public poli-
cies within one government are in conflict so that no clear policy opposing
the other government's policy emerges. In such instances there is no
standoff between mutually opposing public policies and the balancing test
yields a clear result.
United States v. First National City Bank 5 presented a situation
where the public policy of the United States in favor of nondisclosure was
not opposed by a foreign public policy in favor of nondisclosure. First
National City Bank of New York (Citibank) was served with a subpoena
requesting documents from its German branch. The subpoena was issued
by a federal grand jury investigating alleged violations of the antitrust
laws. 89
Citibank declined to comply with the subpoena. The bank claimed
87. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978). See
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980). Cf. First
Nat'l City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959) (the bank failed to
show that Panamanian law would prevent discovery.).
88. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Ci. 1968).
89. Id. at 898.
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that to comply with the subpoena would subject the bank to civil claims
by its customers based upon the bank secrecy laws of Germany. To com-
ply with the subpoena would leave the bank open to economic reprisals
and a potential loss of business."
The Second Circuit rejected Citibank's pleas and enforced the sub-
poena. The court's construction of German law was crucial to its decision.
The court determined that whatever rule may have developed in favor of
bank secrecy was not so important that the German Government was
willing to enforce it. It was up to the bank customer whose secrets were
revealed to bring a civil suit. This civil suit would not be based upon the
statutory law of Germany, but rather would be based upon an implied
contractual obligation between the bank and its customers.91 The court
expressly concluded that the subpoena did not "conflict with the public
policy of a foreign state as expressed in legislation." 92
Since the public policy of Germany was not at stake the court appro-
priately applied Restatement section 40 and concluded that the U.S. in-
terest in disclosure should be enforced. Private parties could not defeat
the efforts of a U.S. grand jury through use of a "contract" for secrecy.93
As might be expected in cases such as First National City Bank,
where the public policy of the foreign sovereign is not really at stake, the
decision could also have also been based upon Citibank's failure to make
a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena. The district court judge
found that the bank had failed to make such good faith efforts, neglecting
to make even ordinary inquiries as part of discovery." Such a lack of
good faith alone justifies enforcement of the subpoena.
The balancing test can also be applied when the public policy of one
government conflicts internally with itself. But for the defendant's failure
to make good faith efforts to comply with the discovery order, the Vetco
case would have presented such a situation. Ordinarily, once the bur-
dened party's efforts reveal a genuine conflict between discovery and non-
disclosure, the U.S. policy in favor of discovery emerges as superior when
the information is truly necessary to the U.S. litigation. However, where
there is in existence a treaty between the United States and the foreign
government regarding the issue for which discovery is sought, and that
treaty provides mechanisms for the exchange of information, the treaty
must be viewed as the exclusive means for obtaining information when-
ever a genuine conflict of law exists. The existence of the treaty creates a
policy contrary to the U.S. interest in discovery and thereby tips the
scales of the balancing test in favor of the foreign nondisclosure law.
The mere existence of a tax treaty providing for the exchange of in-
90. Id. at 899, 904.
91. Id. at 899, 901, 903.
92. Id. at 901.
93. Id. at 905.
94. Id. at 900 n.8.
VOL. 12:1
FOREIGN NONDISCLOSURE LAWS
formation does not mean that in all cases only treaty procedures may be
used to obtain information from the foreign territory." Treaty procedures
should not be exclusive unless the treaty so provides. The Swiss-U.S. tax
treaty does not provide that the methods for information exchange are to
be exclusive. 96 Therefore, in Vetco it was entirely proper for the IRS to
issue its subpoena.
Issuance of the subpoena was proper despite the apparent conflict
with Swiss law. As the rule has developed, discovery orders should always
issue so that the burden to attempt to eliminate any conflict with the
foreign law is placed on the party subject to discovery. If the burdened
party fails to make such good faith efforts, as Vetco apparently failed to
do, then penalties must issue for noncompliance with the discovery order.
Such penalties are proper regardless of what the foreign law is claimed to
be. However, in the court's eagerness to apply the balancing test and find
for the government, the court stated that treaty procedures are not the
exclusive mechanism for obtaining discovery in tax matters." Although
often true, such a statement is incorrect whenever a genuine conflict with
foreign law is present. If Vetco had demonstrated to the court that it had
made good faith efforts to comply with the subpoena, it would have been
entirely improper for the court to impose sanctions because of Vetco's
failure to comply with the discovery sought.
Section 40 of the Restatement explains this rule. It calls for a balanc-
ing of interests and other factors of lesser significance."9 The Restate-
ment's balancing test yields no result in a discovery versus nondisclosure
conflict, where the national interests at stake are in balance and contra-
dict each other. However, section 40 does yield a result when the matters
subject to discovery are covered by a treaty which establishes discovery
procedures.
Where a treaty exists, the balancing test is applied as follows. On the
one hand, there is the foreign interest in nondisclosure. On the same side
of the scale is that foreign government's reasonable expectation that an-
other nation will not ignore established treaty procedures, when to do so
would be to create a conflict with that government's disclosure policies.
On the other hand, there is the U.S. policy in favor of disclosure. How-
ever, offsetting that policy is the U.S. policy which favors upholding the
reasonable expectations of signatories to treaties with the United States.
It is contrary to the spirit, if not the actual terms, of a treaty to seek
enforcement of a discovery order contrary to foreign law where a treaty
provides procedures for releasing the desired information. If the specific
information sought cannot be released pursuant to the terms of the
treaty, and the information sought cannot be released under the foreign
95. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 433 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
96. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, at art. XVI.
97. 644 F.2d at 1328. See also United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 433 (M.D.
Fla. 1979).
98. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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law, then it must be presumed that the parties intended that such infor-
mation is not to be disclosed. Any other interpretation would require a
substantial degradation of the authority of treaties as U.S. law.
The Ninth Circuit in Vetco recited the long-established rule that a
statute and a treaty are to be read consistently, to the greatest extent
possible. 99 Although correct, this rule does riot require that all ambiguities
be interpreted in favor of the U.S. law. Where application of U.S. law
would require conduct directly contrary to the foreign law, great defer-
ence must be given to the provisions of the treaty, as that treaty estab-
lishes the common agreement of the two sovereigns whose laws are in
conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proper role of treaties in U.S. law is a subject of much interest
and complexity. A comprehensive evaluation of the subject cannot be ac-
complished within these pages. However, for purposes of applying the
balancing test, it is not necessary to define that role. It is only necessary
to point out that the existence of the treaty weighs against U.S. disclosure
rules that are contrary to the reasonable expectations of the other signa-
tory to the treaty.100
The existence of a treaty reconciles the standoff between equally le-
gitimate policy concerns of two sovereigns. In favor of nondisclosure is
the public policy of the foreign sovereign and that sovereign's reasonable
expectations of an agreement made with the United States. Balanced
against those interests is the public policy of the United States favoring
disclosure, diminished by its implied agreement with the foreign sover-
eign whose law is sought to be circumvented. In such a situation the in-
terests of the two governments are not on the same plane of policy; the
interests of the foreign sovereign in nondisclosure are clearly superior. If a
conflict with the foreign disclosure law exists, after a discovery order has
been issued and a good faith effort at compliance has been made, then
that foreign law must be given deference whenever a treaty makes provi-
sion for the disclosure of information related to the subject of the
litigation. 1'0
99. 644 F.2d at 1328 (Cases cited therein stand for the same proposition.)
100. The intent of the parties is persuasive in interpreting treaty provisions. Maximov
v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963); Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940);
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
101. Illustrating this principle is the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie
de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The issue in that case
was whether it was proper for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to serve an investiga-
tory subpoena by use of registered mail. Saint-Gobain is different from the cases discussed
in the text in that the issue there was not whether certain documents were discoverable, but
whether the method of obtaining the personal jurisdiction necessary to discovery was
proper.
In ruling that the FTC acted improperly, the circuit court relied in part on two princi-
ple facts. First, the French Government objected strenuously to the method of service em-
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It is most important to recognize that, in the situation described,
where the existence of a treaty permits the application of the balancing
test, the question of the U.S. need for the information is never reached.
The Vetco court placed some importance on the reluctance of authorities
to cooperate in tax investigations10 ' The court also noted that in the
Swiss-U.S. tax treaty, Switzerland had reserved the right not to transmit
business secrets pursuant to the information exchange provisions of the
treaty.105 In the court's view, the anticipated inability to obtain the coop-
eration of Swiss authorities emphasized the need of the court to enforce
the discovery order.
However, the need for the information is only relevant when the poli-
cies of the two governments are mutually contradictory. Where, because
of a treaty, the balance of interests is upset and the foreign interest in
nondisclosure emerges as superior, the need of the U.S. court for the in-
formation becomes irrelevant. There is no legitimate basis to enforce the
discovery order regardless of what the perceived need for the information
might be. '
In fact, the comments of the court in Vetco highlight the role of the
treaty in tipping the scales in favor of the foreign nondisclosure law. The
U.S.-Swiss tax treaty specifically provides that the Swiss Government re-
served the right not to reveal business secrets.105 When the United States
accepted the treaty, the obvious implication was that the United States
promised not to require tax information over the objections of the Swiss
ployed by the FTC. In other words, in the French view the method of service was contrary
to French law. 636 F.2d at 1306 n.18, 1325-27. Second, in examining whether or not Con-
gress intended that the FTC issue subpoenas contrary to foreign law, and possibly contrary
to international law (See 636 F.2d at 1315-18), the court interpreted the powers of the FTC
as granted by Congress as requiring in part that the agency use established diplomatic pro-
cedures. 636 F.2d at 1323. The court implied that where an existing convention applies to
the procedural matter at issue, it is improper to go beyond that convention. 636 F.2d at 1313
n.69.
The Saint-Gobain case has been cited as requiring adherence to conventions regarding
discovery when a deviation from the procedures established in the convention would conflict
with the law of the country where the requested documents are located. Pain v. United
Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Cf. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d
Cir. 1960) (Subpoena for bank documents located in Canada would not be enforced as the
Canadian law provided for procedures in Canadian courts whereby these documents could
be sought and disclosed, subject to the disclosure limitations imposed by Canadian law.).
102. See note 22 supra.
103. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, art. XVI (1)&(3).
104. "Unless it unmistakenly appears that a congressional act was intended to be in
disregard of a principle of international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to
be in conformity with it." The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D.Conn. 1925). "[Aln act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .... "Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804). Cf. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (deference
should be given to foreign nondisclosure law once a true conflict with that law has been
presented.).
105. Income Tax Convention, supra note 20, art. XVI (1)&(3).
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Government. Given the clear implications of the treaty regarding disclo-
sure of business secrets, the interest of the Swiss nondisclosure law must
clearly prevail over the interest of a U.S. court or agency in obtaining the
information. The United States was under no obligation to sign the tax
treaty with Switzerland. Once it did so, the reasonable expectations of the
Swiss Government arising from that treaty had to be given deference.
Where the policies of the two governments are otherwise in direct con-
flict, the implied recognition of the Swiss law of business secrets by the
U.S. Government pursuant to the treaty requires that the Swiss secrecy
law take precedence.s10
The task of a court in resolving a discovery versus nondisclosure con-
flict need not be overly complex. The court is always permitted to issue
its discovery order and require the burdened party to make a good faith
effort to obtain release of the requested information. If it is determined
that an irreconcilable conflict with foreign law exists, the typical ap-
proach of the court is to evaluate the need for the information sought.
Where the court cannot reasonably proceed without the requested infor-
mation, the law of the forum is applied and discovery is ordered.
There are exceptions to this general rule, however. The court evalu-
ates the necessity because the competing interests of the sovereigns are in
balance. Where a public policy of a foreign sovereign is not at stake, or
where the information sought is subject to treaty procedures for disclo-
sure, the competing interests are no longer in balance. In such instances
the balancing test applies in favor of that sovereign whose public policy is
unambiguously involved.
106. The Supreme Court has stated: "Considerations which should govern the diplo-
matic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their
obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties
to secure equality and reciprocity between them." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,
293 (1933). Applying this rule to the Swiss-U.S. tax treaty, where the Swiss Government has
preserved in the treaty its right to withhold information protected under Swiss law, that
treaty must be liberally construed to prevent the attempted enforcement of U.S. subpoenas
contrary to that Swiss secrecy law. The obligations of equality and reciprocity imply this
respect for Swiss law. Cf. United States v. Burbank, 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975) (tax treaty
regarding discovery of documents liberally construed in favor of local law of state in which
documents were sought.
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